Thursday, February 15, 2007

Midterm Exercise, distributed Feb 15th

Midterm Exercise (link removed)

Tuesday, February 13, 2007

Notice of Class Cancellation for February 13

Class is cancelled for today, February 13. Please refer to the email waiting in your mailbox for further instructions. Additional information will be posted here in due course.

Thank you––and I apologize for any inconvenience.


Greg

Saturday, February 10, 2007

Sunday, February 4, 2007

Natsume Sôseki's "The Civilization of Modern-Day Japan"

Last week, Jocelyn discussed Ueda Makoto's essay on The Tale of Genji in conjunction with Natsume Sôseki's famous 1909 lecture "The Civilization of Modern-Day Japan." Here it is, for those who are interested:

"The Civilization of Modern-Day Japan" (pdf)

Reading Kant

As promised, I have made a humble attempt to provide you with a basic sketch of Kant's fundamental ideas, particularly as they relate to The Critique of Judgment (which we discussed in seminar). Currently, this is an on-going project, so please check back regularly for exciting information about Kant and his fun ideas!

1. Kant's Epistemological Framework: Basic Vocabulary and Concepts
Kant on the à priori and the à posteriori (selected excerpts from the "Introduction" the Critique of Pure Reason):
  • "That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare, to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it." (1)
The preceding quote is the first paragraph of the introduction. Despite Kant's focus on the importance of à priori knowledge, and his legalistic rhetoric, it is important to note that Kant begins his first critique with a very modern supposition: knowledge begins with experience. However, Kant is careful to point out, "experience" is not necessarily the result of empirical knowledge and personal experience. À priori knowledge is not the same as Platonic "forms"; although "we do not derive this knowledge immediately from experience [...] we have itself borrowed from experience" (2). Thus, for Kant, à priori knowledge is predicated upon the limitations of our faculties of reason, understanding, and cognition. Human à priori knowledge is just that: human. It is based upon our shared experiences, knowledge, and "common sense":
  • "Thus, if a man undermined his house, we say, 'he might know à priori that it would have fallen'; that is, he needed not to have waited for the experience that it did actually fall. But still, à priori, he could not know even this much. For, that bodies are heavy, and, consequently, that they fall when their supports are taken away, much have been known to him previously by means of experience" (2)
However, the division of knowledge into categories does not stop with the distinction between à priori and à posteriori knowledge. Kant is also careful to disinguish "pure" [a concept he later associates with "analytical" judgments] and "impure" [a concept he later associates "synthetic" judgments] à priori knowledge. In many respects, this distinction is similar to the different types of aesthetic judgments Kant discusses in the The Critique of Judgment. Like "disinterested" beauty, "pure" à priori knowledge is "not mixed up" with empirical elements. Pure à priori knowledge, like disinterested beauty, relies less upon our passions and actual interaction with the "real" world:
  • "By the term 'knowledge à priori,' therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only à posteriori, that is, through experience. Knoweldge à priori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge à priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, "Every change has a cause," is a proposition à priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience." (2)
To be continued...

Saturday, February 3, 2007

Handouts from Thursday, Feb 1

The Sublime, the Modern, and the Postmodern (pdf)
This handout discusses the relationship of the sublime to François Lyotard's notion of postmodernity. I include his definition of the postmodern as well as his concept of the "differend." In addition, I quote a passage from the book Writing Ground Zero by John W. Treat, who applies Lyotard's discussion of the importance of the Holocaust as a defining moment of the postmodern period, to the Atomic Holocaust in Japan.

Nietzsche's "The Dionysian Worldview" (pdf)
I assigned the first three pages of this essay for next Tuesday's class (Feb 6). For those that are interested in reading the entire first part of the essay, here it is.

"The Madman" by Friedrich Nietzsche (html)
Another touchstone text that we will refer to repeatedly this term.

Examples of Historians (pdf) cited in Hayden White's Tropics of Discourse and Metahistory.
During the last few weeks, we have been discussing various theories of history and language. Drawings largely upon Nietzsche's essay "On the Use and Abuse of History for Life," White argues that all history "tells a story" and can be discussed as literature––regardless of whether it is synchronic or diachronic history. White's theories have been embraced by literary historians and theorists, but not always welcomed by those who defend history as a "dispassionate" and "scientific" discipline. This handout contains excerpts by historians who defend the latter position, as well as those who embrace the notion that history can be described by various types of narratives. White labels these writers––including Marx, Hegel, and Nietzsche––as "philosophers of history."